Professor Kolstad’s research interests lie in the intersection of health economics, industrial organization and applied microeconomics. The unifying theme of his work is an effort to understand how information, market structure and regulation alter firm organization, individual incentives and, ultimately, performance and welfare. In recent work he has studied entry and competition in hospital markets, the impact of specialty hospital entry on general hospital service provision and the impact of quality information on demand as well as intrinsic surgeon incentives. In ongoing work Dr. Kolstad seeks to estimate the welfare gains from risk protection provided by health insurance. In related work he is studying the impact of the Massachusetts health insurance expansion on a variety of outcomes of interest to researchers and policy makers. In a separate project he is studying the role of social networks among physicians in referral patterns.
Kolstad J: Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards. American Economic Review. 2013; 103(7): 2875-2910.
Kolstad J, Loewenstein G, Friedman JY, McGill B, Ahmad S, Linck S, Sinkula S, Beshears J, Choi JJ, Goldman R, Madrian B, List JA, Volpp K. Consumers' Misunderstanding of Health Insurance. Journal of Health Economics. 2013; 32:850-862.
Kolstad J, Kowalski A: The Impact of Health Care Reform on Hospital and Preventive Care: Evidence from Massachusetts. Journal of Public Economics. 2012; 96(11-12):909-912.
Kolstad J, Werner R, Stewart E, Polsky D: The Effect of Pay for Performance in Hospitals: Lessons for Quality Improvement. Health Affairs. 2011; 30(4):690-698
Kolstad J, Cutler D, Huckman R: Is Entry Efficient When Inputs are Constrained? Lessons from Cardiac Surgery. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2010; 2(1):51-76.
Kolstad J, Chernew M: Quality and Consumer Decision Making in the Market for Health Insurance and Health Care Services. Medical Care Research and Review. 2008; 66(1):28S-52S.